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I.

INTRODUCTION

What would it mean for society if every individual's actions were
recorded from his or her point of view? Would this create clarity, or more
confusion and worry? There is no easy answer to these questions.
However, in terms of the accountability of law enforcement officers
* The author would like to recognize his friends and family for their encouragement, especially
his parents, Mark and Annette-their support and guidance made his education possible.
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around the United States, it seems there is a popular solution to the

The
growing concerns of police misconduct around the country.'
solution, championed by a wide variety of individuals, is to record the
actions of law enforcement officials in the course of their duties.2 To do
this effectively likely requires the increased use of police-worn body
cameras. 3 There are many active supporters of the use of body cameras in
policing; this comes as no surprise in light of recent events around the
nation.

4

The recent events that spurred this call for reform in the use of body
cameras are many and varied, but two have received a great amount of
national attention: the police shooting of Michael Brown, 5 and the death
of Eric Garner while in police custody.6 The shooting of Michael Brown
1. See Developments in the Law-Policing, 128 I-ARV. L. REV. 1794, 1795-96 (2015) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law-Poling] (commenting on the desire for objective evidence in police-civilian
interactions following recent incidents of the use of police force as a way to increase the
accountability of law enforcement and deter misconduct); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and
Bod Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 836 (2015) (addressing the moral panic which occurred
following the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri which led to far reaching support for
the use of police-worn body cameras to prevent similar future incidents from occurring and
discussing whether or not the cameras would provide the solution their proponents seek).
2. See Developments in the Law-Policin, supra note 1, at 1796 ("The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) also repeatedly voiced its support for widespread adoption of... new technology,
heralding body cameras as 'a win-win' as long as civilian privacy remained properly protected.");
Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Caper's Cime,
Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 993, 997 (2013) (proposing police-worn body
cameras as a more reasonable solution than the use of wide-spread surveillance to "make sure that we
know what the police are up to"); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 832 (providing a counter perspective
to body cameras as a solution to the moral panic created by the shooting).
3. See Martina Kitzmueller, Are You Recording This?: Enforcement of Poie Videotaping; 47 CONN. L.
REV. 167, 178 (2014) ("[Ift is a safe assumption that a police department that makes its officers
record all encounters and that uses videos to hold officers accountable would likely not have incited
the same public rage as the Ferguson Police Department did in the wake of Michael Brown's
shooting.").
4. See Developments in the Law-Pocing, supra note 1, at 1794-95 (2015) (using the shooting of
Michael Brown by a police officer, the death of Eric Garner while in police custody, and the public's
response to those incidents as background information for discussion of the use of police-worn body
cameras by specifically addressing the view point of the ACLU and the actions taken by the White
House).
5. See Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/uichael-brown-darren-wilson-ferguson-protests.htri
(discussing the climate in Ferguson, Missouri following the grand jury decision not to prosecute the
officer who shot and killed Michael Brown and providing information on the protests that followed
along with the response of law enforcement).
6. See Radley Balko, Some Thoughts on Eric Garner, WASH. POST, (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/12/04/some-thoughts-on-eric-garner
(reporting on the decision of the grand jury not to charge the officer who put Eric Garner in a choke
hold with Garner's death which occurred as the result of a subsequent heart attack while he was in
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occurred on August 9th, 2014, and sparked outrage for several reasons. 7
Brown was young and unarmed at the time of the shooting, and many
members of his community and commenters on the incident saw race as
the primary factor in the shooting.8 Understandably, there were different
beliefs as to what happened leading up to the incident. The officer who
shot Brown, and the grand jury that decided not to indict him for Brown's
death, believed the shooting of Brown was justified.9 On the other hand,
others believed Brown did not act in a way that necessitated the use of
deadly force.1 0 Supporters of body camera use see this uncertainty,
created by the differing accounts of the incident, as a problem which
would be solved by wide-spread body camera use. 1
Unlike the shooting of Michael Brown, the death of Eric Garner was
captured on tape. 1 2 The video was not recorded from a police-worn body
camera but by another citizen not involved in the arrest.1 3 During
Garner's arrest he was placed in a chokehold. 1 4 It was later found that
this chokehold contributed to his death due to Garner's weight, asthma,
police custody and opining on the circumstances surrounding Garner's death).
7. See Mac Ehrenfreund, What We Know About What Happened in Ferguson, WASH. POST,
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/25/get-completelycaught-up-on-whats-happened-in-ferguson (detailing the circumstances of the shooting of Michael
Brown along with the grand jury decision and the aftermath in Ferguson, Missouri).
8. See Wesley Lowery, Carol D. Leonnig & Mark Berman, Even Before Michael Brown's Slaying in
Ferguson, Racial Questions Hung over Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/even-before-teen-michael-browns-slaying-in-mo-racialquestions-have-hung-over-police/2014/08/13/78b3c5c6-2307-1 1e4-86ca-6fO3cbd1 5ca-story.html
(reporting that racial tensions in Ferguson, Missouri may have played a part in the shooting of
Michael Brown, and stating that tensions, already present for years, have grown drastically following
the shooting).
9. See Ehrenfreund, supra note 7 (reporting on the results of the grand jury investigation and
providing that the officer who shot Michael Brown claimed he was in danger because Brown
attempted to grab his weapon).
10. See id. (describing the views of witnesses that gave contradicting statements-that the
officer was the aggressor instead of Michael Brown and that Brown did not put the officer's life in
danger by reaching for his weapon--on the incident alleged).
11. See Developments in the Law-Pocng supra note 1, at 1800 (casting doubt on the assertion that
one of the reasons for the growing support of body cameras is their ability to capture truly objective
evidence as a way to know what happened without bias affecting the evidence).
12. Balko, supra note 6 (pointing to the reaction to the footage of Eric Garner's arrest as
evidence that the use of body cameras can be a vehicle to enact change).
13. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric
Garner's Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/ericgarner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html ("As [the officers] moved in, a cellphone camera held by
a friend of Mr. Garner recorded the struggle that would soon be seen by millions.").
14. Id. See James Queally & Alana Semuels, Eric Garner's Death in NYPD Chokehold Case Ruled a
Homidde, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-garnerhomicide-20140801-story.html (detailing the decision to rule Eric Gamer's death a homicide).
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and heart disease."5 The video produced controversy over the methods
the police used to arrest Garner. Many saw the use of a chokehold to be
unnecessarily violent 16 or an abuse of force, while others saw the force
used as reasonably necessary to enact the arrest.1 7
These incidents all demonstrate one thing: when high profile instances
of police force are caught on tape, there a debate can be expected over
whether their use of force was justified.1 8 The argument for the use of
body cameras is simple. In theory, the debate surrounding whether or not
an officer's use of force is justified would be answered definitively by
reference to the footage obtained during the incident by the body camera
attached to the officer at the time. 9 The footage would provide objective
evidence of the incident,2 ° and importantly, would allow an individual-or
group of individuals-to view the incident from the perspective of the
officer who used the force.2 1 This would allow them to step into the
15. See id (listing several of health factors that may have caused the police chokehold to result
in death).
16. See Balko, supra note 6 (proposing the video of Eric Garner's arrest showed a level of force
used that many people would consider to be excessive). It has been posited that seemingly
innocuous laws, such as selling untaxed cigarettes, are enforced with violence or the threat of
violence, and that how a law is enforced should be established as well as the law itself to prevent
similar uses of excessive force. Id.
17. See Evan Horowitz, An Interpretation of the GrandJuy'sDecision on Eric Garner's Death, BOS.
GLOBE (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/04/understanding-eric(reporting the
garner-death-and-grand-jury-decision/s9uQPMvcKPD2mAmFy2ln9J/story.html
grand jury's decision not to indict the officers involved in the Eric Garner's arrest).
18. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 832 (detailing the position of body camera supporters'
argument that body camera use in the shooting of Michael Brown would have provided evidence on
what really happened-either a justified use of force or an overreaction to an objectively peaceful
situation).
19. See Developments in the Law-Poling, supra note 1, at 1800 ("Proponents of body cameras
often herald these cameras' unique ability to provide an 'unambiguous' account of police-civilian
encounters.").
20. See id. at 1803 (suggesting the use of body camera footage can be effective evidence for
trials because cameras provide beneficial and objective evidence); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who
Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother's Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L.
REv. 389, 406 (2012) (viewing civilian recorded video of police encounters with civilians as objective
and trustworthy evidence that is beneficial in establishing facts in a clearer manner than relying on
witnesses and their credibility and advocating for the legality of such recordings). But see Developments
in the Law-Policing, note 1, at 1812-13 (proposing overreliance on video footage as completely
objective evidence may not be wise, as other possibilities may be excluded and the complete picture
of the situation is not examined when only the narrow point of view of the camera is analyzed);
Wasserman, spra note 1, at 840 (presenting an alternative view to the objectivity of video footage by
acknowledging the way a video is shot may affect what is seen on video which is not always the same
between people with different "cultur[es], deomographic[s], [and other] social, political, and
ideological characteristics").
21. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring
Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 360-61 (2010) (providing a
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shoes of the officer to determine if the officer's use of force was
reasonable based on the circumstances the officer faced in that moment.2 2
However, there are potential negative effects stemming from the use of
body cameras. 23 A potential negative impact of the increased use of body
cameras, as argued by their opponents, is the potential for the cameras to
tie the hands of the officers wearing them, limiting their discretion and
judgment in dangerous situations, and ultimately putting the public at risk
24
of ineffective policing.
Both sides of this divided issue miss something important. The focus
of both points of view is entirely on the effect body camera use will have
on police encounters with citizens. Specifically, the arguments are either
based on the potential reduction of police misconduct and increased
accountability to prevent the public from being harmed2 5 or alternatively,
the negative impact such cameras may have on the efforts of police to act

comparison between the use of police-worn body cameras and the now wide-spread use of dash
cams in police vehides, and explaining different ways the body-worn cameras can be attached to a
law enforcement officer).
22. See id. at 362 (explaining an experiment that compared a law enforcement officer with a
body camera and an officer without a body camera done and stating that the experiment clearly
showed what the officer wearing the body camera saw and heard "as she received a radio call and
began to pursue a person reportedly carrying a gun into an apartment complex").
23. See id. at 367 (listing several potentially unexpected consequences from using body cameras
in law enforcement including fewer people approaching officers and individuals interpreting footage
in different ways).
24. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policng's New Visibily and the Role of "Smarphone
Journalism" as a Form of Freedom-PreservingRedprocalSurveillance, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 59, 84
(2014) (suggesting the use of body cameras may serve to "exacerbate the compromised position of
the patrol officer," who is constantly battling "dual pressure[s]" of both the need to be right and the
need to take action).
25. See Developments in the Law-Policing, sopra note 1, at 1803 (explaining part of the purpose of
body cameras is to provide increased accountability and transparency thereby allowing citizens to feel
more secure in the actions taken by police officers); Matthew R. Segal & Carol Rose, Race, Technology,
and Policing, 59 BOS. BAR J. 27, 29 (2015) (supporting a "system of police-worn body cameras, with
appropriate privacy protections [to] protect both law enforcement and the public"); Waleska Suero,
Note, Lessonsfrom Floyd v. Ciy of New York. DesigningRace-Based Remediesfor EqualProtection Violaions in
Stop & Frisk Cases, 7 GEo. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 139, 143 (2015) ("The use of body
cameras is an important race-based remedy for monitoring the allegations of racial discrimination
that increasingly appear in complaints in stop and frisk cases."); Balko, supra note 6 (arguing the video
footage obtained during the arrest preceding Eric Garner's death accomplished the goal of body
cameras-increasing transparency of police action to identify problems in policing techniques that
lead to police misconduct); see also Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras:A Primer on
Police Accountability v. Pnvay, 58 HOWARD L. J. 881, 887 (2015) (asserting another benefit to using
police-worn body cameras-the "transparency also extend[s] to the internal structures within the
police department ....[e]ven if officers display behavior that are not actionable or subject to
disciplinary proceedings').
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effectively in protecting the public.2 6 The arguments often fail to
acknowledge a different concern: What effect will the increased use of
recording devices in policing have on the rights of individuals who are not
the subject of police misconduct investigations? In an era of everadvancing technology, the increased use of widespread video recording,
although intended to prevent misconduct of police officers, creates
rights of individuals to be free
concerns over the Fourth Amendment
27
from unreasonable searches.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The FourthAmendment in General

The Fourth Amendment 28 to the U.S. Constitution provides protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures for citizens of the United
States.2 9 The amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.3 °

This amendment has been shaped by the judiciary to evolve with the
needs of an ever-changing society; as a result, it has been applied to a wide
variety of circumstances. 3 1 Regardless of the circumstances, the Fourth
26. See Newell, supra note 24, at 84 (suggesting the use of body cameras may serve to
compromise the position of police officers "who [are] often under the 'dual preassure[s] to "be right"
and to "do something,"' even in stressful or dangerous situations" by disrupting the nature of those
situations).

27. See id. (suggesting increased measures to assure the public that information gathered from
body cameras is not used arbitrarily or used to interfere with the lives of citizens "[i]n a modern
society where surveillance has become a stable and accepted element of everyday life").
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. Id.; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (implying a search that compromises
a legitimate privacy interest is subject to Fourth Amendment protections); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (recognizing, in most cases, a warrantless search of a citizens home will not be
considered reasonable, and would be unconstitutional); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, (1990)
(addressing the perceived differences between a "search" and a "seizure" and the interests they
protect (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984))).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding the use of a Global
Positioning System (GPS) device to track the movement of a motor vehicle was a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (stating government agents used a thermal
imaging device to determine if an individual was growing marijuana inside his home and concluding
the use of the thermal imaging device constituted a "search" under the Fourth Amendment); Bond v.
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Amendment still stands to protect an individual from searches in instances
where the individual maintains a "reasonable expectation of privacy. "32
However, as surveillance technology continues to progress, and is used
more expansively in law enforcement, concerns arise over how new
33
surveillance methods may affect these same individuals.

United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (examining a situation in which a piece of luggage was
handled in a manner intended to shift its contents and provide the person handling it an idea of what
was inside and concluding such action violated a reasonable expectation of privacy because the
individual may expect other bus passengers or employees to handle the luggage, but does not expect
them to manipulate it with the purpose of discovering what it contains); New York v. Class, 475 U.S.
106, 114-15 (1985) (declaring that a police officer's discovery of a hand gun while reaching into an
individual's motor vehicle in order to move papers obscuring the vehicle identification number
(VIN) during a traffic stop was a search, but the search was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984) (discussing the Fourth Amendment
implications of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) placement of a beeper in a can of
ether that was later acquired by the respondents); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(holding an electronic listening device, placed on the outside of a phone booth, was an unreasonable
search in the absence of a warrant acquired through the judicial process); United States v. Taketa,
923 F.2d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing whether there can be a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and, as a result, Fourth Amendment protection, in the use of a third party's office and
application of a "conspirator exception"); United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 938
(N.D. Ohio 2014) (addressing the warrantless installation of a camera adjacent to a business for
purposes of surveillance in relation to the reasonable expectation of privacy standard); United States
v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843 (D. Ariz. 2012) (evaluating the use of a pole camera in an
apartment complex's parking lot to surveil an individual who resides in an adjacent apartment
building).
32. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951-52 (clarifying that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is an
addition to-not a replacement for-"the common-law trespassory test.'); Kar0, 468 U.S. at 712 ("A
'search' occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed."' (quotingJacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (1984))); Taketa, 923 F.2d at 670-71 ("A valid [F]ourth
[A]mendment claim requires a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable.");
Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (explaining a search can occur in two ways: (1) a physical trespass done
to gather information or (2) violation of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy).
33. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (stating "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology" in the Court's application of a reasonable expectation of privacy standard to law
enforcement's use of a thermal imaging device); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the
Constitufion of Pubhc Space.- Fiting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identiy, 82 TEX.
L. REv. 1349, 1374-75 (2004) (asserting technology used for surveillance has changed significantly
from the creation of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to a point where it has become
far less costly, and yet has become endlessly more efficient in regard to the information able to be
obtained); Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of Public Places,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 757-58 (2008) (discussing the various ways in which camera
technology is advancing and the need for increased regulation to match growing privacy concerns,
including the linking of vast integrated camera networks, increasingly detailed images with high
resolutions, inferred and motion capture imaging, the increasingly automated nature of these systems,
drones, and others); Bennet Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959,
963 (2013) (acknowledging the increased presence and ability of surveillance cameras in major cities,
and indicating those cameras are able to capture much more than in the past due to advances in
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Regardless of the technology used, a reasonable expectation of privacy
is still applied as the relevant standard in cases where no physical trespass
is involved.3 4 The Supreme Court articulated this standard in Katz v.
United States.35 Prior to the reasonable expectation of privacy, courts
engaged in an analysis that required a physical trespass to property, as a
prerequisite to falling under the protection of the Constitution. 3 6 Katz
changed this in 1967. In Katzj the Court examined the FBI's use of an
technology and use of surveillance); Sean K. Driscoll, 'The Lady of the House" vs. a Man with a Gun:
Applying Kyllo to Gun-Scanning Technology, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 601,637 (2013) (analyzing the potential
Fourth Amendment issues present with use of gun-scanning technology); Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in
the Sky: Consitulionaland Regulatory Approachesto Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. RFV. 1, 56 (2014) (addressing potential Fourth Amendment concerns in the context of increasing unmanned
aerial drones and alluding to the fact that the law is often slow to keep up with changes in
technology); Newell, supra note 24, at 60-61 (recognizing the increased use of more sophisticated
forms of video surveillance by law enforcement as well as the increased use of smart phones and
other recording devices by the general public). But see Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not like 1984: A
Broader Perspective on Technolog's Effect on Privag and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRM.L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534-35 (2007) (suggesting technology advancements provides citizens with
further methods of protecting their privacy in addition to allowing more advanced methods of
gathering information for government agents).
34. See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 953 (announcing when there is no trespass, and there is only the
"transmission of electronic signals" the proper analysis involves the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (holding there is no legitimate privacy
interest in contraband a citizen hopes to conceal from the authorities, and thus any expectation of
privacy in the concealment of contraband is unreasonable); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (explaining a search
of one's home without a warrant is a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's home,
where one expects to "be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"); United States v. Alabi,
943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1273 (D. N.M. 2013) (addressing Fourth Amendment concerns of Secret
Service agents accessing information contained in the magnetic strips of credit cards already in their
possession and reasoning there was no violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy because the
information obtained was clearly visible on the surface of the credit cards in question); United States
v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840 (D. Ariz. 2012) (employing the reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis to the installation of a pole camera in an apartment building parking lot); Capers, supra note
33, at 965 (commenting on how the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, applied to
government surveillance of public places, is still a prevailing view of Fourth Amendment doctrine,
and questioning the apparent result of that view-that any exposure to a public area would relinquish
a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus, Fourth Amendment protection).
35. Katk, 389 U.S. at 347.
36. See id. at 352-53 (conceding prior case law did support the Government's argumentwhere there is no penetration of tangible property, no Fourth Amendment inquiry is needed-and
proceeding to explain how that premise has been discredited); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942) (holding there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment and no trespass when
government agents placed a detectaphone, a discreet listening device, against a wall to overhear the
conversations and telephone calls occurring on the other side), overruled by Katz v United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding a private
telephone conversation intercepted through a wiretap did not invoke Fourth Amendment protection
because there was no search or seizure of any "tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion
of [a home] for the purpose of making a seizure"), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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electronic listening device attached to the outside of a telephone booth to
record the conversations occurring within the booth.3 7 Analyzing the
Fourth Amendment in that context, the Court concluded there need not
be a physical or technical trespass to constitute a search or seizure
deserving of constitutional protection.3 8 Instead, the Court in Katz
created a standard that applies to the individuals themselves, as opposed to
the location of the search.3 9 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, articulated
the standard as a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy... "40 Harlan's concurrence has become the basis for the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard, and its application to Fourth
Justice Harlan
Amendment issues involving search and seizure.4 1
explained:
As the Court's opinion [in KatJ states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places'... My understanding of the rule that has emerged from
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
the
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
42
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'

Justice Harlan's concurrence defined what was necessary to be
protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) a subjective
manifestation of an expectation of privacy; and (2) that the expectation of
privacy be objectively reasonable based on societal expectations.4 3 In
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has applied Justice Harlan's analysis
to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.4 4 When
a search is conducted, without a warrant, under circumstances in which an
37. Kat., 389 U.S. at 348.
38. See id. at 353 ("The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve [a recording] did not
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.").
39. Id.
at 351 ("The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
40. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) ("Our [cases after Katc have applied
the analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in that case, which said that a violation occurs when
government officers violate a person's 'reasonable expectation of privacy."').
42. Kat7, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See id. ("[T]he rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
requirement, first
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'); seealso
Max Guirgus, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectayion of Privagy, 9 TECH. L. & POL'Y
143, 174 (2004) ("The ultimate measure of constitutionality is not the location of the observer, but
the reasonable expectation of the observed in the location under surveillance.").
44. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (noting the Supreme Court has relied on Justice Harlan's analysis
of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)
(applying the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as articulated in Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Kat).
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individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, that search is per
se unreasonable.4" Absent a showing that the search was reasonable
under the circumstances, the search violates the Fourth Amendment.4 6
This standard was recently reiterated in United States v. Jones4 7 as an
addition to the common law trespass test that was relied upon prior to the
Court's decision in Katz.4 8 In Jones, the Court made it clear the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is to remain the standard in cases where there is
no physical trespass involved, 4 9 but allowed for the common law trespass
standard to continue to apply in cases where the search involved a physical
intrusion of the property in question.5 0 Justice Scalia explained this in the
majority's opinion, writing: "[We do not make [the common law] trespass
[standard] the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission
of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to the Katz
analysis. '"51
The common law trespass standard differs from the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard; a court may apply both methods of
analysis to determine if a search is reasonable under the meaning of the

45. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 (explaining the reasonable expectation of privacy standard put
forth in Kaq still applies and if a reasonable expectation of privacy is violated, a Fourth Amendment
violation may occur); Kat7, 389 U.S. at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
46. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (caveating there are specific exceptions
allowing for warrantless searches to still be considered reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
47. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
48. Id. at 952 ("But as we have discussed, the Kaiq reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not subsfitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test.").
49. See id. (disagreeing with the view expressed in the Justice Sotomayor's concurrence-the
Katz analysis involving a reasonable expectation of privacy should be the exclusive standard used to
examine whether a search is per se unreasonable-by arguing "[s]itutations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis").
50. See id. at 951 (explaining the KatZ Court did not hold the property interests protected by the
common law trespass standard would be weakened by the adoption of the new reasonable
expectation standard); Soldal v. Cook County., Illinois, 506 U.S. 56, 62-64 (1992) (rejecting the
respondent's argument-that Katz held "the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with
property rights"-by stating "our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as
well as privacy"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(clarifying that Katz held "that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental invasions of a
person's reasonable 'expectation[s] of privacy,' even when those invasions are not accompanied by
physical intrusions," but when there is a physical intrusion to gather information there may still be a
constitutional violation).
51. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
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Fourth Amendment.12 Under the reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis, the Court will presume that a search conducted without a
judicially authorized warrant is unreasonable per se if the analysis set forth
in Justice Harlan's concurrence in KatZ is satisfied, and assuming no
warrant exception exists, regardless of whether or not there was a physical
trespass.5 3 However, where there is a physical trespass accompanied by
an intention to gather information, the Court will presume a warrantless
search is unreasonable in accordance with the common law trespass
standard.5 4
The common law trespass standard developed around the historical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment which was intended to protect
property interests.5 5 With a search involving a physical intrusion of an
individual's property, these historical property interests are affected, and
the trespass standard applies. 5 6 The Court expanded this historical
52. See id. at 951-52 (clarifying the different circumstances in which the reasonable expectation
of privacy test is applied and the common law trespass standard is applied and implying both tests are
ways of determining the reasonableness of a search). Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (expanding the narrow view asserted in past cases-that only common law property interests
are the basis of Fourth Amendment protections and as a result a physical invasion of such property is
necessary to constitute a violation-to include violations of an individual's reliance on an expectation
of privacy which includes conversations taking place within a phone booth), uitb Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (rejecting the argument that evidence gathered by wiretapping a
private phone conversation without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the
amendment was created with the purpose of preventing warrandess searches of a person, his home,
or his other tangible property and without a physical invasion of such property there can be no
Fourth Amendment violation), overruled by Katz., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
53. See Kat"4 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating his interpretation of the
majority's opinion is that where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, that area is
constitutionally protected and that an invasion of that constitutionally protected privacy is
presumptively unreasonable without a search warrant); Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment
Future of Pubic Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 25
(2013) (asserting the view of the Supreme Court and other legal scholars: the Fourth Amendment
requires the government obtain a valid warrant when circumstances point to a reasonable expectation
of privacy, but when there is no such expectation a warrantless search or visual inspection is generally
not an unconstitutional search (citations ommitted)).
54. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (stating a search, conducted without a
judicial warrant, is presumptively unreasonable unless it meets a specific exception); Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 950-51 (reiterating that where there is a physical trespass in an constitutionally protected area
accompanied by an intent to gather information, such action may be unconstitutional (citing Knotts,
460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring))).
55. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463 ("The well-known historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment... was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his person,
his papers, and his effects .... "), overruledby Kat., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), andBerger, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
56. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (recognizing the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
established in Katz, extends Fourth Amendment protection outside of property rights, but also
recognizing it does not eliminate previously protected property rights).
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protection to apply to places and circumstances where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.5 7 Therefore, if there is a physical
invasion of the property, a common law trespass standard will apply, and if
there is no physical invasion, the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard will apply.5 8
The Court has recognized specific circumstances that do not normally
create a reasonable expectation of privacy and operate to allow warrantless
searches without violating the Fourth Amendment.5 9
Endorsed
exceptions include: searches occurring incident to arrestj ° searches in an
57. See Katk 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining Fourth Amendment protections go further than
protecting certain property, but may also protect "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public").
58. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952-53 (reiterating the common law trespassory test is still
recognized, in addition to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, but that it should not be applied
in "[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass").
59. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (restating the ultimate issue in Fourth
Amendment cases is reasonableness, which is usually achieved by obtaining a judicial warrant, but in
cases where there is no valid warrant, a search will only be considered reasonable "if it falls within a
specific exception to the [Fourth Amendment's] warrant requirement" (citing Kentucky v. King
563 U.S. 452, 459-60 (2011))); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014) ("[C]ertain
categories of permissible warrantless searches have long been recognized."); Missouri v. McNeely,
133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) ("Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the person is
reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception.'); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006) (following the principle that searches must be reasonable, and normally will require a warrant
"subject to certain exceptions"); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 516-17 (11th Cir. 2015) ("The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, not warrantless searches. As the text of the
Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search
is 'reasonableness."'); Ford v. State, No. PD-1396-14, 2015 WL 8957647, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec.
16, 2015) ("Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to certain
'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions." (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958))).
60. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969-71 (2013) (examining the constitutionality of a
DNA swab after the arrest of an individual and holding such action is a search, but such a search,
when conducted under certain circumstances, can be reasonable because the right of the government
to search an individual incident to a legal arrest has always been recognized); Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding police officers may conduct a search without a warrant, probable
cause, or even reasonable suspicion as part of the arrest of an individual, as long as that search is
limited to areas "adjoining the place of arrest" from where the officer may be concerned a danger
may be hidden, but "[b]eyond that... there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene"); Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (concluding the search of an automobile's compartments
following a crash was justified as long as it was limited to places a weapon may be hidden and only
when the officers reasonably believe "the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons[,]" and in this case the search did not turn up any weapons, but the marijuana
that was discovered as a result was deemed to have not been obtained by means of an illegal search);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (addressing the issue of a police pat-down of a potential
robbery suspect and stating "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest,
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"open field," 6 1 searches necessitated by the exigencies of the situation,6 2
searches where consent is given, 63 and searches involving evidence in
plain view. 64 The case-by-case analysis of these exceptions is still based
on an examination of the search's reasonableness in light of the
circumstances; these exceptions simply help define whether or not the
search was reasonable. 65 For example, the Court in Kentucky v. King6 6
however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation ....[and] must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of [dangerous
nearby] weapons").
61. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013) (defining "curtilage" as the area
around a home, immediately associated with the home, so as to allow an objective belief that the
privacy protected within a home extends to that area and, as a result, that area is protected by the
Fourth Amendment, but the area beyond the curtilage of a home, or "open fields," is beyond this
reasonable expectation of privacy and outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-80 (1984) (agreeing with Justice Harlan's concurrence in KaQ,--that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy, but protects
expectations of privacy the rest of society is willing to accept as reasonable-and stating an
expectation beyond the curtilage of a home, extending into "open fields" is not objectively
reasonable and not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
62. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 ("One well-recognized exception applies when 'the
exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."" (quoting Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978))); Stuat, 547 U.S. at 406 (holding a police officer's entry was reasonable due
to his objectively reasonable belief that there was an injured person inside and there may have been a
risk of continuing violence which constituted the exigent circumstances necessary for action without
a warrant). The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement provides courts the
opportunity to examine the reasonableness of a warrantless search on a case-by-case basis and allows
for additional exigencies to qualify based on fact-specific inquires. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1559
(stating that in circumstances where there is no warrant establishing jurisdiction, the court may allow
a fact-specific inquiry to determine if a particular emergency situation established the reasonableness
of the search). However, there are several specifically defined exigencies: emergency assistance, "hot
pursuit" of a suspect, entering a burning building, preventing the destruction of evidence, and others.
Id. at 1558-59.
63. See Eernandeg, 134 S.Ct. at 1137 (holding a warrantless search of a home is reasonable
where consent was obtained even though a warrant was available because requiring a warrant, after
consent is given, places an unnecessary burden on the police officer, the magistrate, and the party
who gives consent); Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (accepting the well-settled
Fourth Amendment view that a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless a specific
exception, such as consent, is implicated).
64. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (applying the plain view doctrine to
legally-conducted pat downs). The plain view doctrine applies when law enforcement officials
engaged in a legal search, come across evidence that is out in the open, or within "plain view." Id.
As it is in plain view, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, and such evidence may be seized
without a violation of Fourth Amendment protections if it was viewed from a lawful position and
officers have a lawful right to access the object. See id.
65. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. at 459 (acknowledging that some warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable, but such presumptions "may be overcome in some circumstances
(citing Brigham
because '[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness .....
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))).
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addressed the issue of police officers entering a residence without a
warrant to prevent the destruction of evidence. 6" In Kng, the Court
explained the general requirement that a search of a home must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant to be reasonable. 6 8 However, "the
warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions." 6 9 The
Court then examined whether the imminent destruction of evidence
70
qualified under the well-recognized exigent circumstances exception.
Exigencies of the situation, such as where the destruction of evidence is
likely, cause a search to be reasonable even if conducted without a
71
warrant.
Another rationale for denying Fourth Amendment protections, reflected
in the recognized exceptions of "open field" searches and the "plain view"
doctrine, is based on the public nature of the "search" in question. 7 2 The
rationale is that the Fourth Amendment does not provide protection when
there is a knowing exposure to the public; it is this reasoning that many
video surveillance cases seem to rely on.7 3
66. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
67. Id. at 456-57.
68. See id. at 459 ("[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable." (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))).
69. Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
70. Id. at 460.
71. See id. ("[T]he need 'to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence' has long been
recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search." (quoting Brigham v. Stuart, 563 U.S.
452, 403 (2006))). Here, the Court mainly examined whether it is still reasonable to conduct a search
to prevent the destruction of evidence, when such destruction is prompted by the police officers
themselves. See id. at 461. The Court concluded such action may rise to the level of an unreasonable
search, but an officer knocking on the front door is not unreasonable. Id. at 469.
72. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1982) (concluding that when driving on
public streets there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy due to the voluntary nature of such
travel); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (expressing the view that if a person
knowingly exposes something to the public, there is no expectation of privacy, and therefore, the
Fourth Amendment is not applicable); Slobogin, supra note 2, at 267-69 (construing Supreme Court
case law to reflect the view that what is exposed to the public is not something that can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that "police observation from a public vantage point is not a
search, even if the area observed is the curtilage, traditionally considered part of the home").
73. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding the government's use of a
thermal imaging device to observe the inside of a home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
because the device was not in use by the public and therefore violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 ("[Nio such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation
of [the defendant's] automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway .... ."); United
States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2015) (alluding to the lack of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a parking garage due to its public nature and likening parking in such a structure to being
parked on a public street); Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 459-60 (7th Cir. 2007)
(analyzing a situation in which the plaintiffs claimed an illegal search had taken place in violation of
the Fourth Amendment as a result of a deputy following them while they drove along public streets

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/4

14

Nielsen: Fourth-Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras

2016]

B.

COMMENT

Video Surveillance and the Use of Pole Cameras

At this time, there is little to no discussion of the Fourth Amendment as
it realtes to police-worn body cameras, as they have only been
implemented in a few jurisdictions, 7 4 and what little discussion there is
focuses mainly on the ability or lack of ability of the body cameras to
regulate police behavior.7 5 To examine potential concerns created by
police-worn body cameras in relation to a civilian's Fourth Amendment
rights, it is necessary to begin by discussing Fourth Amendment concerns
through the broader lens of video surveillance in general.
An issue currently being addressed in many courts is that of law
enforcement officials mounting cameras on utility poles in public areas for
purposes of surveillance. 7 6 These cases do not involve physical trespasses,
as the cameras are installed in public areas (usually on public utility poles),
and therefore do not invoke the common law trespass standard. 77 Rather,
and patronized local businesses and holding that such actions did not constitute a search because
there was no legitimate interest in privacy while driving in public or visiting local businesses, both of
which are activities knowingly exposed to the public); United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855,
(E.D. Tenn. 2013) (noting there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a pole camera was
set up in an area that was accessible to the public and law enforcement officials because "it did not
provide law enforcement with a vantage point they could not have enjoyed from the ground," even
though no warrant was obtained and the camera was directed toward the defendant's property;
however, the court held the surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the tenweek duration of the surveillance); Blitz, supra note 33, at 1378 (distinguishing between video
surveillance within a private home or office and video surveillance from a public vantage point,
stating that in the latter "courts have almost always found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable").
74. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 837 (asserting any attempt to state the effects of policeworn body cameras on police behavior would be mere speculation because "[t]he technology and its
use by actual police are too new to know its true effects").
75. See Developments in the Law-Poidng supra note 1, at 1814 (concluding that using body
cameras may present problems and "the presence of a camera is no guarantee that officers will
temper their use of force'; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 836-37 (addressing the widespread call for
increased use of police-worn body cameras as a means to increase police transparency and reduce
violence and discussing why increased body camera use may not provide the benefits that its
advocates hope for). See generally Harris, supra note 21, at 357 (proposing widespread use of policeworn body cameras would be effective in increasing police officers' professionalism, and would
ensure their actions are in compliance with Fourth Amendment procedures).
76. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296, 2015 WL 5145537, at *1 (D. Mass.
Sept. 1, 2015) (examining law enforcement's use of a pole camera employed by the FBI for
surveillance of property adjacent to the defendant and the installation of a new pole camera following
the defendant's move); United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (N.D. Ohio 2014)
(discussing Fourth Amendment concerns arising from a warrantless installation of a pole camera-at
the request of local authorities-by the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the sole purpose
of surveying defendant's business operations); United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 87172 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (addressing the installation of a pole camera adjacent to defendant's property,
where a subsequent warrant for continued use was issued, and surveillance continued for ten weeks).
77. See ymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (accepting the common law trespass search was not
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the issue addressed in these cases is whether, under the specific
circumstances of the surveillance, the use of a camera mounted from a
public vantage point violates an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.7 8 At least one of these courts explicitly applied
the two-part
analysis presented in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katt 7 9 but all courts
that have addressed this issue base their analysis on whether there can be
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in anything visible to the
general public.

80

By following the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, these
federal courts have held, in large part, that surveillance from a public
vantage point through the use of a pole camera does not violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy.8 1 This is because a pole camera placed
in a public place, even if for the purpose of surveillance, exposes no more
to law enforcement officers than what the individual being surveyed
implicated because law enforcement did not install a camera on the defendant's property, so there
was no trespass and no claim of a trespass search can be made).
78. See Garda-GonZale
.-, 2015 WL 5145537, at *3 (indicating the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard applies to pole camera surveillance by reiterating the two-part analysis set forth in
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Kat; Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 938 ("The closer question is whether
the government violated Wymer's reasonable expectation of privacy with its covert and continuous
video surveillance of the premises for four months.").
79. Garda-GonZale; 2015 WL 5145537, at *3 (stating the Iat Z analysis applies due to the use of
an electric means without physical trespass and putting forth Justice Harlan's two-part analysis as a
way "to establish a Fourth Amendment violation").
80. See id. (applying a reasonableness standard when there was no physical trespass); Wymer,
40 F. Supp. 3d at 939-40 (concluding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because
the property was exposed to public view); Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (holding that use of a pole
camera alone was not unreasonable, but may become unreasonable depending on the duration and
the circumstances).
81. See Garia-GonZalq , 2015 WL 5145537, at *8-9 (holding, reluctantly, a pole camera's
extended viewing of a residence did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy because it did
not attempt to see more than was possible from the public view and the length of time it was
installed did not constitute a violation of a reasonable expectation based on binding precedent
upholding the surveillance by a warrantless pole camera in place for eight months); Wymer, 40 F.
Supp. 3d at 938-39 (concluding the reasonable expectation of privacy is not violated because the
property in question was commercial in nature and there were no attempts to "shield the property
from public view"); Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 871-72 (implying the warrantless installation of a
pole camera is not a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy, but stating that if such
surveillance is continued for an unreasonable period of time it would become a violation); Brown,
supra note 33, at 760 (explaining there is little to no regulation regarding the use of surveillance
cameras in public places and acknowledging the courts have not defined clear guidelines for what is
and what is not reasonable, yet "[t]hey have held that individuals can expect to be videotaped in or
on streets, sidewalks, taverns, front yards, hallways at self-storage facilities, mountaintops, open
fields, and the common areas of public bathrooms"). The view these courts take-that anything
videotaped from a public vantage point is not something in which a reasonable expectation of
privacy can exist is mirrored by almost every state and federal court that has addressed the issue of
the surveillance from a public vantage point. See Blitz, supra note 33, at 1379.
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displays to the public in general; therefore, the individual cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and as a result the Fourth Amendment
provides no protection and no warrant is required for the installation of
such cameras.

82

Although courts hold the use of these cameras to be reasonable, they
allude to the possibility that the method and manner of the surveillance
associated with pole cameras may be sufficient to violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and therefore may implicate the Fourth
Amendment and its protections. 8 3 The United States District Court in
Massachusetts recently articulated this possibility with reference to Jones,
Kat-Z, and United States v. Knottsy 4
In Jones, the majority specifically noted that Katz did not withdraw any of the
protection which the amendment extends to the home. The majority
opinion also impliedly rejects as unsupported, by Knotts or otherwise, the
suggestion that an unconstitutional search is permissible if it produces only
public information. At the same time, the majority quoted Knotts as
recognizing the "limited use which the government made of the signals from
this particular beeper," and noted that Knotts "reserved the question whether
'different constitutional principles may be applicable' to 'dragnet-type law
enforcement practices' of the type that GPS tracking made possible here."
This suggests that the twenty-four-hour dragnet-type surveillance the Court
in Knotts warned about may violate the Fourth Amendment even though all
of the information gathered is public. For, in the face of advancing
technology, "what a person knowingly exposes to the public," endangers
profoundly different ramifications than it did in 1967, when Katz was
82. See Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (relying on the reasoning in Kat, which stated: "what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection"); Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (reasoning if the pole camera was not able
to see more than what was already visible to the public in regard to activities occurring within a
residence, then there is no "search" under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Brown, supra
note 33, at 759460 ("A public place is generally considered to be one in which individuals do not
have reasonable expectations of privacy. The result is that, 'according to the law, everything that
occurs in a public place cannot be held out to be a private activity."').
83. See Garia-Gon ale , 2015 WL 5145537, at *7 ("Twenty-four-hour dragnet-type
surveillance... may violate the Fourth Amendment even though all
of the information gathered is
public.., in the face of advancing technology, 'what a person knowingly exposes to the public,'
endangers profoundly different ramifications than it did in 1967 when Katz was decided."); seealso
Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV.49, 71 (2015) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of drone use and proposing that
the manner in which the technology is used plays a significant role in determining its constitutional
implications-for example, "just because other people are of course free to observe my public
movements does not mean, without more, that the government may use technology that logs a
significant portion of those movements").
84. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982).
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One factor frequently discussed involves the length of time the
surveillance can continue before reaching the point of being
unreasonable. 8 6 The Supreme Court hinted that this may be a relevant
factor in determining if a reasonable expectation of privacy is violated in
Knotts.8 7 The majority opinion in Jones does not directly address a
temporal issue, 8 8 but Justice Sotomayor points out in her concurrence that
long-term surveillance may provide much greater detail about an
individual. 8 9 District courts have applied this reasoning to acknowledge
the possibility that prolonged surveillance from a pole camera may violate
0
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.9 Another factor which
could give rise to a pole camera's use violating a reasonable expectation of
privacy is the high-tech nature of the camera or the ability of the camera to
adjust what it is able to see-meaning the camera has the ability to zoom,
85. Garcia-Gonza
a er, 2015 WL 5145537, at *7.
86. See id. (commenting that continuous, fulltime surveillance may violate the Fourth
Amendment (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1982))); Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d
at 871 (concluding the warrantless installation of a pole camera did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, but the continuous ten-week operation of that camera, in spite of a lack of an
established time considered to be reasonable, was unreasonable).
87. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 n. 6 (2012) (explaining that the holding in
Knolts was limited in scope to government use of a particular beeper which left open the issue of
whether continuous "dragnet- type" surveillance may require increased constitutional protection and
stating that the extended use of a GPS tracker made such dragnet-type surveillance possible in that
case); Knolts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (relaying the respondent's claims that the government was engaged
in what amounted to twenty-four hour continuous surveillance without a warrant due to their use of
"scientific devices" (in this case a beeper), but ultimately rejecting that argument in these
circumstances because the Court.has "never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality[,]" and
waiting to consider such "dragnet" type surveillance for a case that properly presents it for
consideration); Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (explaining that a pole camera used for over eight
weeks after a two-week warrant expired was a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy
because "ten weeks crosses into the unreasonable, provoking 'an immediate negative visceral
reaction' suggestive of the Orwellian state").
88. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (responding to Justice Sotomayor's concurrence by commenting:
"[lit remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is 'surely' too long and why a drug-trafficking
conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an 'extraordinary offens[e]'
which may permit longer observation[,]" posing questions over what time period is reasonable and
what time periods are unreasonable, and concluding the Court will have to wait and address these
"vexing problems" in the future when a case that implicates the reasonable expectation of privacy
test cannot be resolved, as it can here, through the application of the common law trespass test).
89. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing long-term GPS
surveillance may violate an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy because law enforcement
can gather large amounts of data in great detail and at low cost).
90. See Gania-GonZale-, No. 14-10296, WL 5145537, at *8 (discussing Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence and acknowledging the merits of considering that long-term and detailed surveillance
may violate an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy).
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pan, or see at night. 9 '
It seems that in most instances there will be no physical trespass in cases
dealing with video surveillance. 92 As a result, the standard applied will
likely be based on a reasonable expectation of privacy. 93 However, if
surveillance is prolonged in an unreasonable manner, or if the capability of
a recording device far surpasses what an individual reasonably believes
they have exposed to the public, then warrantless video surveillance may
violate the reasonable expectation of privacy.9 4
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Reasonable Expectaion of Privay and Body Camera Use

There is no question more citizens will be recorded with widespread use
of body cameras,9" but do police-worn cameras maintain a reasonable
91. See United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 Fed. Appx. 396, 405 (6th Cit. 2012) (opining
most citizens do not expect the government to put their yards under surveillance for long periods of
time or do so with hidden cameras capable of zooming and panning); United States v. Nerber,
222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cit. 2000) (noting "the legitimacy of a person's expectation of privacy may
depend on the nature of the intrusion[,]" and acknowledging that the nature of the video surveillance
can, when highly focused, rise to a high level of intrusion which violates a reasonable expectation of
privacy); Blitz, supra note 53, at 31 (stating surveillance in public spaces threatens Fourth Amendment
rights even without permanent documentation of the surveillance obtained through recording and
explains "[p]olice can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses to scrutinize details on a
person's clothing, or on items or documents removed from a wallet or briefcase, that would be
invisible to bystanders just a few yards away"); Guirguis, supra note 43, at 180 ("[B]ased on precedents
in which the Court has consistently held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
public, it can be inferred that 'traditional' camera surveillance will readily pass constitutional
muster-unless additional technology is employed to augment the natural senses of sight and
hearing.").
92. See United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 938 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (accepting the
common law trespass search was not implicated because law enforcement did not install a camera on
his property, so there was no trespass and therefore no claim of a trespass search).
93. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (holding both the reasonable expectation of privacy standard and
the common law trespass standard are applicable to potential Fourth Amendment violations;
however, if there is not physical trespass onto the property but "merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass" then the reasonable expectation of privacy standard applies in place of the
common law trespass standard).
94. See id. at 954 (explaining the Court's decision was based on common law trespass and not
based on the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, but conceding that a future case involving
electronic surveillance may raise the issue of whether extended electronic surveillance crosses the line
into unreasonableness under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard put forth in Kat,-); Blitz,
supra note 53, at 26-27 (explaining that, although the Court in Jones alluded to the possibility that a
term of surveillance in a public place may rise to a Fourth Amendment violation if the circumstances
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court did not "clearly identify how long or how
intense the public surveillance must be to cross the constitutional dividing line").
95. See Taylor Robertson, Lights, Camera,Arrest: The Stage Is Setfor a FederalResolution of a CifiZen's
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expectation of privacy when recording? If the footage obtained in the use
of body cameras is that which may be visible to anyone from a public
point of view, it seems likely that the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard will be applied in the same manner in which it applies to the use
of other police surveillance cameras filming from public locationsnamely the use of pole cameras. 9 6 This would mean as long as the officer
wearing the body camera is in a public location, the camera is incapable of
recording anything that could 97be considered within an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
At this time, the prevailing view with respect to pole cameras maintains
there is usually no reasonable expectation of privacy when recording from
a public vantage, though some scholars have commented on the view's
lack of practical applicability for increasingly advanced surveillance
technology. These critics argue the use of cameras must be further
defined to apply the ideals of the Fourth Amendment to modern
technology, especially when the camera has the capacity to record. 98 This
Right to Record the Police in Pubkc, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 143-44 (2014) (advocating the rights of
citizens to record law enforcement officers in the course of their duty and acknowledging the risk of
more civilians who are not under arrest or suspicion being recorded due to their interactions with the
police).
96. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296, 2015 WL 5145537, *1 (D. Mass. Sept.
1, 2015) (examining law enforcement's use of a pole camera already employed by the FBI for
surveillance of property adjacent to the defendant and examining law enforcement's installation of a
new pole camera following the defendant's move); Wlymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (discussing Fourth
Amendment concerns arising from an warrantless installation of a pole camera, for the sole purpose
of surveying defendant's business operations, by the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation at the
request of local authorities); United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 865 (E.D. Tenn. 2013)
(noting there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a pole camera was set up in an area
that was accessible to the public and law enforcement officials because "it did not provide law
enforcement with a vantage point they could not have enjoyed from the ground" even though no
warrant was obtained and the camera was directed toward the defendant's property; however, the
court held the surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the ten-week duration
of the surveillance); United States v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843 (D. Ariz. 2012) (evaluating the
use of a pole camera in an apartment complex's parking lot to survey an individual who resides in an
adjacent apartment building).
97. See Triano, supra note 20, at 409 (asserting that an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is no longer enjoyed in many public settings, neither law enforcement nor private citizens,
because "being subject to a video recording is an accepted fact of modern society").
98. See Blitz, supra note 53, at 30 (distinguishing the implications of mere observation as a form
of surveillance and the implications of observation combined with recording that observation as part
of the surveillance); see also Kitzmueler, supra note 3, at 177 (comparing old methods of recording
which necessitated large equipment and access to and storage of physical film, with the modern small
recording devices and the seemingly endless storage capabilities available through "compact discs,
flash drives, hard drives, and now even in a 'cloud"'); Triano, supra note 20, at 409 (proposing the
concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially in a public setting, "must be adjusted to
reflect the advancement of modern technology").
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is because there is an inherent difference between viewing something as it
happens and recording the occurrence. 9 9 These observations appear not
only in the discussions of advancing camera ability and recording capacity,
but also in new forms of surveillance such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(drones)O°
B.

Common Law Trespass Standardand Body Camera Use

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the reasonable expectation of
privacy is not the exclusive standard applied in all Fourth Amendment
cases."' The common law trespass standard applies in cases involving
physical trespass.1" 2 It follows that police use of a recording device,
including a body camera, when on the property of another may be
sufficient to implicate the common law trespass standard.1" 3 A situation
where a body camera records images of an individual's property while the
officer is on that individual's property may easily occur in the everyday
actions of law enforcement officers performing their duties.10 4 In these
situations a common law trespass standard may be applied if the recording
takes place on the property of another without a warrant.10 5 Such
99. See Blitz, supra note 53, at 30 (arguing that recording is inherently more intrusive than
simple observation because even if the camera does not create a privacy concern by simply viewing,
the fact the video footage may later be re-watched and scrutinized compromises the privacy of the
individual to a greater extent).

100. See Blitz et al., supra note 83, at 72 (acknowledging the revival of the common
law trespass standard by the Supreme Court in Jones, and suggesting the standard may

be applicable to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles depending on how the Court
eventually defines the concepts of trespass in relation to the common law trespass
standard); Farber, supra note 33, at 5-6 (addressing potential Fourth Amendment
concerns in the context of increasing unmanned aerial drones, and alluding to the fact

the law is often slow to keep up with changes in technology).
101. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) ("[A]s we have discussed, the KatlZ
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.").
102. Id. at 953 (clarifying the common law trespass standard may be applied in situations where
there is physical trespass, but allowing for the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to continue
to be applied in situations where there is "merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass [and] would remain subject to the Kat.Z analysis").
103. See Blitz et al., supra note 83, at 72 (acknowledging the revival of the common law trespass
standard by the Supreme Court in Jones and suggesting the standard may be applicable to the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles depending on how the Court eventually defines the concepts of trespass in
relation to the common law trespass standard).
104. See Newell, supra note 24, at 85 (commenting on the discretionary nature of police work
which permits a high degree of flexibility in many policing situations and stating the use of body
cameras may create concerns in diminishing the ability of officers to use this discretion).
105. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 ("The Government physically occupied private property for the
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recordings, taken without warrant or probable cause will likely violate the
law
Fourth Amendment when analyzed according to either the common
10 6
trespass standard or the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Emergency situations, as discussed earlier, are cause for police officers
But what if
to enter premises for purposes of conducting a "search." ' '
officers conduct such a search while wearing a body camera? The
recording in that situation seems to exceed the search contemplated by the
exception. 10 8 The exception exists to allow officers to enter premises, or
otherwise conduct a search to prevent events that are time sensitive, as
long as their actions are reasonable in light of the circumstances. 1 0 9 An
example of this is to prevent the destruction of evidence.1 1 0 However,
recording such a warrantless entrance may cross the line to a trespass and
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This is because the
recording is not necessary to serve the purposes of the emergency
search.1 1 1 It would only serve to allow for warrantless documentation of
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.").
106. See id. at 951-53 (holding either the common law trespass standard or the reasonable
expectation of privacy test may be applied to situations where a search is involved depending on
whether or not there has been a physical trespass); Developments in the Law-Policin&supra note 1, at
1808 (acknowledging the use of police recording in a private home may create additional privacy
concerns that would not be at issue in the course of unrecorded police activity while on the property
of a private citizen).
107. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (discussing the exigencies of the
situation as a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, allowing for officers to conduct a
search under emergency circumstances, and giving examples of emergency circumstances which
include "the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a
fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent
injury").
108. See Blitz, supra note 53, at 30 (arguing that recording is inherently more intrusive than
simple observation because even if the camera does not create a privacy concern by simply viewing,
the fact the video footage later be may later re-watched and scrutinized compromises the privacy of
the individual to a greater extent).
109. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-60 (2011) (listing (1) providing necessary aide; (2)
preventing imminent harm; (3) imminent destruction of evidence; or (4) when in active pursuit of a
suspect as examples that fall under the exception). But see Claire R. O'Brien, Recent Development,
Reasonable Suspicion or a Good Hunch? Dapolito and a Return to the Objeceive Evidence Requirement, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 1165, 1182 (2015) (arguing courts should require more objective evidence be presented to
justify an officer conducting a Tery search of an individual when applying a standard of reasonable
suspicion as a way to further "justify the intrusion into the individual's life").
110. See King, 563 U.S. at 460 (identifying the prevention of the imminent destruction of
evidence as a recognized emergency situation in which law enforcement officers may conduct a
"search" that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment).
111. See id. (listing several examples of when exigent circumstances make the search objectively
reasonable, all of which depend on imminent action and none of which necessitate recording of the
officer's actions).
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a search that is authorized only to prevent the occurrence of the
1 12
emergency itself.
C. Legislalive Refponse
The climate that the recent events of police misconduct created in the
United States is one of concern and anger directed towards law
enforcement. 1 3 As a result of these incidents, and public outcry for
increased accountability, many law-making bodies around the country have
begun passing legislation in an effort to address the public criticism of
policing techniques and the perceived ineffectiveness of current
procedures intended to protect the public from police misconduct." 4
Legislatures around the United States have begun by setting forth
requirements for law enforcement agencies to establish the rules associated
with body camera use,"' however such actions do not automatically
alleviate all of the concerns associated with police misconduct or body
camera use." 6 For example, in 2015 the Maryland Public Safety Code
was amended, requiring the Maryland Police Training Commission to
publish a policy online by the first of 2016 that includes: testing of body
cameras; procedures to follow; when to record; when not to record; when
consent is needed to record; who has access to the recordings; how the
recordings are to be used; specific protections in situations that involve an
expectation of privacy; and several others."' These requirements leave
the police with a large amount of discretion, and it is unclear what
standards will be employed moving forward. As a result of this
112. See Developments in the Law-Policin&supra note 1, at 1808 (addressing concerns over a
recorded search of private homes or vehicles due to their intrusive nature and the officers ability to
examine the recordings at a later point in time to see things that would have been unseen in real
rime).
113. See id. at 1794-95 (noting the growing concerns of many communities over methods of
policing and referencing the wide-spread protests and demonstrations occurring after the deaths of
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and others across the country); O'Brien, supra note 109, at 1183
("Recent events have cast doubt on the abilities of officers to self-regulate the constitutionality of
their actions, and citizen-police tensions are high.").
114. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-511 (West 2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 5 1701.655,

1701.657 (West 2015).
115. PUB. SAFETY § 3-511; OCC. 5 1701.655,1701.657.
116. See id. (mandating "the Maryland Police Training Commission shall develop and publish
online a policy for the issuance and use of a body-wom camera by a law enforcement officer[,]"
listing what the policy must address, and providing the commission with a large amount of flexibility
in determining how the cameras will be operated).
117. See id. (listing several requirements for the Maryland Police Training Commission to fulfill
in their development of a policy to dictate the manner in which their officers should be instructed to
use police-worn body cameras).
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uncertainty in how body cameras will be employed, it remains unclear to
what extent the use of body cameras will infringe on the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens. The issue will largely depend on how each
jurisdiction sets their standards for body camera use.
Texas also passed an act in 2015 calling for a similar policy to be
adopted by any "law enforcement agency that receives a grant to provide
body cameras . . ,,118 However, the Texas legislature took the additional
step of providing that any policy promulgated by a law enforcement
agency may not state that the officer is to record, using a body camera, for
an entire shift."' 9 This addresses the concern of individuals being
recorded without cause, or for unnecessarily long periods of time. It also
addresses concerns regarding recordings and the opportunity to review
vast amounts of footage over time. Furthermore, Texas enacted another
code provision in 2015 that allows an officer, at his own discretion, to
discontinue recording or choose not to record at all while equipped with a
This option is available to the officer only in
body camera. 120
"nonconfrontational encounter[s] with a person, including an interview of
a witness or victim."' 1 2 1 The Act also allows for the officer to provide an

indication of why the camera was not activated if he or she is responding
to a call for assistance, 1 2 2 and provides an officer's justification for not
recording "because it is unsafe, unrealistic, or impracticable is based on
whether a reasonable officer under the same or similar circumstances
1'
would have made the same decision.'

23

Legislatures have begun enacting statutes requiring law enforcement
1 24
agencies to define exactly when and how body cameras are to be used.
But does this ensure there will not be a Fourth Amendment violation?
Not entirely. This may serve to limit unnecessary exposure to the
recording of body cameras, however it is unlikely that police will use a high
level of discretion due to the nature and purpose of body camera use in
118. Compare id.(requiring law enforcement agencies to fulfill specific requirements in setting
their body camera policies and to make those policies public by the beginning of 2016), with OCC.
§ 1701.655 (requiring law enforcement agencies which receive a grant for body worn cameras to
ensure that the agency's policy provide for the camera to be used only for law enforcement purposes
and seta policy in line with several other guidelines including: data retention standards (minimum of
ninety days), methods of storage, public access, officer access, internal review procedures, and
documentation of equipment).
119. OCC.5 1701.655.
120. Id. 5 1701.657.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY 5 3-511 (West 2015);
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the first place. 1 25 Law enforcement agencies, in response to the current
climate, are trying to protect themselves by providing increased
transparency and accountability.1 2 6 This means that requirements the
agencies put in place are more likely than not to require as much recording
as possible, not merely recording when there is probable cause or an
existing warrant. 1 2 ' Rather, there is an incentive to record all interactions
with citizens, in accordance with the wishes of body camera advocates, to
avoid unrecorded incidents occurring at unexpected moments.1 2 8
This creates an interesting paradox. The reason so many agencies and

legislatures are requiring body camera use is to ensure police officers are
conducting themselves in a professional manner in all situations1 2 9 and to
ensure there is objective evidence in cases where the use of force
occurs. 1 0 However, there is no way to fully predict when these instances
125. See Harris, supra note 21, at 365 (arguing police body cameras may provide increased
Fourth Amendment protections for individuals by forcing police conducting a search or seizure to
regulate their behavior and remain within constitutional limits).
126. See Peter Hermann & Rachel Weiner, Issues over Police Shooting in Ferguson Lead Push for
Oficers and Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/crime/issues-over-police-shooting-in-ferguson-lead-push-for-officers-and-body(reporting many law
cameras/2014/12/02/dedcb2d8-7a58-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdcstory.html
enforcement agencies in large cities are beginning to enact body camera programs after public outcry
following allegations of police misconduct as a means to help resolve "the debate over accountability
and trust," and asserting that such cameras will likely become standard equipment in policing).
127. See Newell, supra note 24, at 85 (claiming police-worn body cameras would only be
effective in increasing police accountability if either the cameras are always activated and recordinggiving law enforcement officers no discretion on deactivation-or law enforcement officers were
given strict rules for the use of the cameras to ensure they are used for the effect intended and
suggesting for this method to work the public would also need to be able to access the footage,
which would also need to have strict rules on how it is stored and maintained).
128. See id. (suggesting to achieve the goals of law enforcement accountability through policeworn body cameras, the officer wearing the camera must have no discretion as to when the camera
can be deactivated). But see Developments in the Law-Policing supra note 1, at 1806 (suggesting by giving
law enforcement agencies control over setting their policies for using police-worn body cameras "the
very organization meant to be held accountable will be able to prevent these videos from being
created in the first instance or shared after the fact"); Newell, supra note 24, at 83 ("[i]t would be
naive to believe officers (and departments) would: (1) record all encounters judiciously; (2) preserve
all recordings properly; and (3) properly release all footage related to public requests under state
disclosure laws (especially when the footage is damning), unless strict laws and regulations were in
place ....).
129. See Developments in the Law-Policing supra note 1, at 1799 (providing an example of police
misconduct "which has long been an issue of public concern" and acknowledging "[g]rowing anxiety
over police abuse has negatively impacted police departments' public relations, and such tensions
have hampered the effectiveness of law enforcement in the communities they police").
130. See Harris, supra note 21, at 363 (relaying the view of a police chief who favors the use of
body cameras due to their capability to solve issues concerning an officer's conduct); Triano, supra
note 20, at 406 (viewing civilian recorded video of police encounters with civilians as objective and
trustworthy evidence that is beneficial in establishing the facts in a clearer manner than relying on
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will occur, and whenthey do occur, rarely will it be practical, or even wise,
for officers to concern themselves with making sure their body camera is
on and recording.13 1 Due to the purported purposes of body cameras and
the realities of law enforcement, for body cameras to do their job they
must be recording often, not only when an incident is foreseeable. 1 32 As
a result of continuous recording, more citizens will be exposed to the
recording and more warrantless surveillance will occur. 1 3 3 As more
surveillance occurs-and it must to achieve the goals purported by body
camera supporters-there is greater potential for invading the reasonable
expectation of privacy of citizens, and an increased likelihood that Fourth
34
Amendment violations will result.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are varying views on whether the use of police-worn body
cameras is wise.' 3 1 What remains clear regardless of the point of view
witnesses and their credibility and advocating the legality of such recordings).
131. See Newell, supra note 24, at 84 (suggesting the use of body cameras may serve to
compromise the position of police officers "who [are] often under the 'dual pressure[s] to "be right"
and to "do something,' even in stressful or dangerous situations" by disrupting the nature of those
situations).
132. See Harris, supra note 21, at 365 (arguing police body cameras may provide increased
Fourth Amendment protections for individuals by forcing police conducting a search or seizure to
regulate their behavior and remain within constitutional limits).
133. See Robertson, supra note 95, at 143-44 (acknowledging the risk of more civilians who are
not under arrest or suspicion being recorded due to their interactions with the police).
134. Blitz, supra note 53, at 31 (stating surveillance in public spaces threatens Fourth
Amendment rights even without permanent documentation of the surveillance obtained through
recording and explaining "[p]olice can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses to scrutinize
details on a person's clothing, or on items or documents removed from a wallet or briefcase, that
would be invisible to bystanders just a few yards away."). Blitz continues to explain how courts have
grappled with this issue by commenting on how such technology may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment in some circumstances, especially when such a powerful device is aimed at those
areas explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment -"namely, an individual's 'person.... papers,
and effects[,]" and concluding the use of these high powered observation systems creates Fourth
Amendment concerns analogous to recording Id. But seeGuirguis, supra note 43, at 180 ("[B]ased on
precedents in which the Court has consistently held that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in public, it can be inferred that 'traditional' camera surveillance will readily pass
constitutional muster-unless additional technology is employed to augment the natural senses of
sight and hearing.").
135. Compare Triano, supra note 20, at 406 (viewing citizen-recorded video of police encounters
with citizens as objective and trustworthy evidence that is beneficial in establishing the facts in a
more clear manner than relying on witnesses and their credibility and advocating the legality of such
recordings), with Wasserman, supra note 1, at 849 (balancing the prevailing viewpoint in the wake of
the Ferguson shooting-body cameras are a win-win solution for solving problems with policingwith a counterview which casts doubt on whether body cameras are really the best solution to more
complex issues).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/4

26

Nielsen: Fourth-Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras

COMMENT

2016]

taken on the issue is body cameras are a reality that will likely, in the near
future, become prevalent across the United States. 13 6 While their use may
or may not solve problems arising from law enforcement misconduct,
their increased use will inevitably raise concerns over the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens. This is unavoidable if the cameras are to
achieve their intended effect-to record the interactions between law
enforcement officers and the public.1 37 As addressed in this Comment,
the likely result will be the same as seen with other forms of video
surveillance. This means a court reviewing the Fourth Amendment rights
of a private citizen, arising from the use of a police-worn body camera, will
be subject to the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. 1 38 If that
standard is applied under the current framework, then there is no Fourth
Amendment violation anytime the recording is made while the officer is in
a public space.

13 9

However, this is not the case if the officer is not in public or if the
standard begins is applied differently in the future, as some commenters

136. See Developments in the Law-Policin&supra note 1, at 1799-1800 (stating body camera use is
gaining quick support following recent incidents of alleged police misconduct and urging "it is worth
examining the potential merits of this relatively untested technology before it becomes the 'new
normal' in policing"); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 832 (addressing the growing support for the use of
police-worn body cameras following the shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, and providing a counter
perspective to body cameras as a solution to the moral panic created by the shooting); Kate Mather,
L4PD Gets $1 Milon for Body Cameras from Department of Justice, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015),
(reporting
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-body-cameras-20150921-story.htmil
on the recent grant received by the LAPD to purchase and train officers on the use of body cameras
in Los Angeles and stating the LAPD was one of more than two hundred law enforcement agencies
to request such funding).
137. See Developments in the Law-Poian&supra note 1,at 1803 (establishing the main argument
supporters of the increased use of body cameras often cite-the increased accountability and
improved relations between law enforcement and members of the communities).
138. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (clarifying that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is an addition to-not a replacement for-"the common-law trespassory
test.'); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs 'when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."'(quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984))); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1991)
("A valid [F]ourth [Almendment claim requires a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively
reasonable.'); United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp. 3d 933, 938 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (explaining a
search can occur in two ways: a physical trespass done to gather information; or violation of an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring), and citing United States v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2013))).
139. See Stephen Rushin, The Lgislative Response to Mass Poce Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
4 (2014) (discussing the potential future of advancing police surveillance technology, but admitting
"history dictates that any judicial regulation will be limited and likely rely on the often-ineffective
exclusionary rule for enforcement. As a result, Congress and state legislators must play a significant
role in any future regulation of police surveillance").
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are already advocating. 1 40 There have been several proposed solutions to
combat the Fourth Amendment dilemma and protect the privacy of
individuals. These solutions revolve around the policies enacted, which
dictate how the camera is to be used. For example, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), while advocating the use of body cameras14 1 and
acknowledging their use may be helpful in providing evidence of police
encounters with the public, also made suggestions to limit "the ability of
the police to edit footage[,] ... limit[] the use of recordings, and establish
good technological controls." 1'4 2 The theory for these controls is to
ensure the body cameras remain a tool for monitoring the actions of the
14 3
police and not a tool for monitoring the public.
How will these proposed solutions protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of citizens? For now, it appears the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard applies, and there is no violation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights when these body cameras are used to film them from
the officer's views-at least when that officer observes them from a public
vantage point. 144 There is no clear answer for when these public
recordings may rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, and
there will not be a clear answer until the issue of illegal search and seizure
is more fully litigated with respect to the use of police-worn cameras and

140. See Blitz, supra note 53, at 27 (explaining the Supreme Court commented on how video
surveillance may cross the line into becoming unconstitutional and setting forth a potential solution
for the uncertainty left by the Supreme Court in not doing so); Triano, supra note 20, at 409
(proposing the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially in a public setting, "must be
adjusted to reflect the advancement of modern technology").
141. See John Sexton, Justin Sommerkamp & Justin Martin, Ineffable Intuition and Unreasonable
Suspiion: OurRule of Law Failure, 67 SMU L. REv. 729, 743 (2014) (claiming "[the] idea of using police
body cameras could be gaining traction[,]" and using the ACLU's support of body cameras as an
example of the increase in favorability).
142. See id. (discussing the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and in doing so
mentioning the potential use of body cameras, while arguing for a more objective reasonable
suspicion standard).
143. Id. ("In order to ensure that the [body] cameras do not become a tool for the government
to monitor the public, instead of the other way around, the ACLU makes suggestions .... ''.
144. See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 267-69 (construing Supreme Court case law to reflect the
view that what is exposed to the public is not something that can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and that "police observation from a public vantage point is not a search, even if the area
observed is the curtilage, traditionally considered part of the home"); see also United States v.
Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 865 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (noting there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment when a pole camera was set up in an area that was accessible to the public and law
enforcement officials because "it did not provide law enforcement with a vantage point they could
not have enjoyed from the ground" even though no warrant was obtained and the camera was
directed toward the defendant's property; however, the court held the surveillance violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy due to the ten-week duration of the surveillance).
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other public vantage point recordings. Only time wili tell.
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